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Abstract: In this article, basing on offensive lecturing research articles of famous authors on financial 
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1. Introduction 
The study of strategies of the inflation controlling is among the most important 
current issues in related monetary policy (Blackburn & Christensen, 1989, pp. 16-
17) discussions (Blackburn & Christensen, 1989). Several steps have opted for 
intermediate objectives as strategies to achieve price stability. These objectives 
are, in general, either a monetary aggregate, an exchange rate. 
In the early 1990s, the Central Banks of several countries have adopted a 
monetary policy framework known as the “inflation targeting” (Direct Inflation 
Targeting D.I.T) to remedy the difficulties raised by the securing of the exchange 
rate or the use of a monetary aggregate, as main intermediate objectives. To do so, 
they have set a numerical target for inflation. The adoption of an explicit inflation 
target tends to empower the Central Bank and encourage them to achieve the goal. 
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This framework will promote transparency and help the public to understand the 
plans and objectives of the monetary authorities. 
The effectiveness of this monetary policy strategy is linked to its ability to define 
and to announce clear objectives with a guide to expectations of economic agents 
and the market operators. Taking into account the deadlines of shares of monetary 
policy on inflation, monetary authorities must explain their strategy and the factors 
that influence their decisions in a manner clear and frequent, prior to the 
acquisition of a real credibility. Thus, the adoption of a target inflation control in 
several developed countries has led Central Banks to take a number of measures to 
achieve this objective and to increase their credibility. The strategies designed by 
the Central Banks of industrial countries, which have adopted explicit inflation 
targets (the pioneering experience of New Zealand 1990) acquired an independence 
from the political authorities, implemented the mechanisms of transparency 
towards the public, have succeed this control and achieved a high degree of 
credibility. 
Although, other countries, as the Brazil and the Philippines, had have adopted this 
new approach in the conduct of their monetary policy in the end of 90‟s. Unlike, 
at nowadays 2013, some other developing countries (North African countries, 
Gulf countries and some Middle-central Asian countries), experiencing major 
difficulties due to their political instability and to the dependence of their financial 
institutions by a monetary policy mapped out by their respective Governments,. 
It is reportable, before the implementation in practice of the policy of inflation 
targeting, there is not, specifically, theoretical in this area studies, since all 
attempts to research focusing on the degree of independence of the Central Bank 
and the stability of prices. It is just after the experiments in this field, which 
researches open to other extensions of econometric modeling. However, the 
information from these foreign experiences, in the inflation target policy, leads to 
demonstrate relevance spring and the degree of effectiveness of monetary policy 
to achieve its goals, which especially primacy of price stability.  
This paper is organized on two sections as follows:  
For the first section, we will present framework of literature, concerning the 
debate on the choice between a rule policies than discretion, between Keynesian to 
monetarist and their model contributions to the monetary policy. In the second 
section, we will presenting the approach of inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy rule, as well as their practice, interest and prerequisites. Finally, we discuss 
both the benefits and mechanisms of development of this monetary strategy and 
how Bank Central must reorganize their strategies to prepare entering in this new 
monetary regime of Inflation targeting strategy, after the failure of the other 
regimes (i.e. Intermediary aggregates, change rate, etc.) in many countries.  
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2. Literature Review and Models 
The debate on the need to establish a rule in the conduct of monetary policy has 
re-emerged in the early 1970s, in a context characterized by a distrust of the 
economic agents of the monetary authorities. In addition this controversy was 
extended to the question of the implementation of a positive rule as proposed by 
Friedman M. (k % rule), nominal optimal growth of the money supply, or the 
adoption of an active rule which is the Taylor rule. However, in the beginning of 
the 1990s, recent analysts have sought to adapt to emerging economies a 
framework originally designed for the major industrialized economies, by 
integrating the functions of reactions estimated by the Central Banks of new 
variables that may be relevant to these countries. In this regard, inflation targeting 
rule would play an important role in improving the effectiveness of the conduct of 
monetary policies in the achievement of the objective of price stability for the 
Central Banks of the industrialized countries and those emerged, for different 
reasons:  
On the one hand, this rule promotes transparency of monetary policy through 
communication with the public and the markets of information regarding plans, 
objectives and decisions of the monetary authorities. On the other hand, it is 
obvious that this monetary policy framework provides a measure of credibility of 
monetary policy that simplifies the evaluation of the monetary policy resulting in 
a high responsibility. The search for greater competitiveness of the economy and 
the maintenance of financial stability may also justify this consideration. 
 
2.1. Applying Discretionary or Automatic Politics 
Rule or Discretion, this question is at the heart of the modern theory of Central 
Banks. This debate, which would take its true dimension after the appearance of 
the theory General of J. M. Keynes (1939), has evolved over time. The answers 
that we wanted to bring him have brought new issues such as those concerning the 
credibility of the monetary authorities. Indeed, the conduct of monetary policy is 
ensured only on its credibility. Credibility can be defined as a function of the 
difference between the perceived target and the actual target. As such, a Central 
Bank's interest to increase its monetary credibility by ensuring the achievement of 
the inflation target which becomes more reconcilable with the production. It will 
be question of the two objectives of nature opposite which the Central Bank must 
arbitrate to ensure economy stability. 
For good conduct this arbitration, it turns out to be essential to a specific monetary 
rule which allows establishing the link between the intervention of authority‟s 
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instruments and the general economic environment. Several rules of monetary 
policy have been used and validated theoretically by the authorities, whose main 
objective is to replace the direct and discretionary instruments with interventions 
on the monetary market. However, a debate between Keynesian proponents of a 
discretionary policy and monetarists that favored policy rule proves interesting.  
For the former, better act on the economy in the short term by providing a fine 
regulation of macroeconomic aggregates. While for the latter, just follow specific 
rules and the market forces will automatically adjust as economic actors interact 
among themselves according to the rules which allows achieving the balance. 
Generally, a discretionary policy is an active policy in which the Central Bank, 
with no long term strategy, seeks to maximize the well short-term economy. It is a 
policy which is determined for each period on the basis of the current economy, 
the upcoming strategy and how instruments are likely to act on the economy. 
While a policy rule is in which to set monetary policy in the medium and long 
term and to ensure that it is respected. It is a policy that fits in the duration 
and relies on a specified rule. 
 
2.1.1. The Contribution of Keynes and Inheritances in Discretionary Policies 
Based on the writings of Keynes (theory general of employment, interest and 
money, 1936, A Treatise on Money, 1930), and on discussions with monetarists, 
the Keynesians are generally proponents of discretionary policy to act in the short 
term with all available information on the economy and ensure the most favorable 
macroeconomic balance while taking as tool a fine macroeconomic adjustment. 
Also they have to avoid the costly contradictions arising from the disconnection of 
the various levels of Government intervention. 
A discretionary policy is therefore the great deserves the flexibility and should in 
principle allow fine adjustments. In addition, regardless of the status or the greater 
or lesser autonomy of the Central Bank to political power, discretionary 
interventions can enable the Bank to support or strengthen, at least occasionally, 
certain aspects of economic policy of a Government. An argument for 
discretionary policies builds on the idea that, to be effective and act on real 
activity, the monetary authorities must surprise economic agents. Is the choice, for 
example that in fact the Federal Reserve System in the United States which, in 
recent years, intervened on markets unexpectedly, without referring to a few 
preset rules. 
In the wake of the Keynesian revolution, it is considered that the exercise of 
discretion the monetary power has two essential virtues: it gives to the 
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management of the currency some flexibility; it also allows them to articulate 
properly with policies in other areas (e.g. public finances). Aglietta said: “the 
adjustments consistent with the logic of the system were not Automation. It is a 
subtle mixture of rules [...] and active management of monetary tensions by 
interest rates (the crucial importance of the discretionary judgment of the central 
banks)”. (Aglietta, 1990, p. 21) 
 
2.1.2. The Defenders of Monetary Policy Rule 
In the modern theory, Mr. Friedman was the first to be in favor of a rule of 
monetary growth in fixed rate over a long period regardless of the evolution of the 
economic situation and to affix to any discretionary action advocated by the 
theoreticians of modern regulation. It found that the interventions of the Central 
Bank cannot get to setbacks because the monetary decision gives on the basis of 
previous information. There is therefore a delay in the comment. This fact, 
according to Friedman, the discretion policy may amplify the economic cycle 
rather than reduce it, given that its implementation and its impact on the economy 
will be with offset. That its proposal to follow a monetary rule regardless of 
economic conditions. 
The Friedman (K% RULE) 
Milton Friedman advocated, in 1950, automatic control of monetary policy in the 
form of a rule to increase finds money supply according to the increase in volume 
production. That growth rate is constant allows to avoid disturbing the 
expectations of agents and led to an automatic stabilization. Indeed, in the event of 
cyclical overheating, maintaining the same rate of increase in the quantity of 
money will cause an increase in interest rates and therefore breaking the economy 
effect. If slows down, the maintenance of constant rate of money supply growth 
will lead to a monetary upon and an easing of interest rates which will stimulate 
the economy. 
Its proposal is reasoned by the fact that monetary authorities, if they are free, will 
always have interest to deny their initial commitment to monetary policy in order 
to obtain transiently slightly more than growth. But, because of the non-
cooperative game between private operators and the authorities, inflation will 
increase without any gain in terms of employment and income. Discretionary 
policy is, therefore, suboptimal despite its flexibility in terms of response to 
instant shocks to the economy. 
The more recently developed rules include it Taylor mechanically linking the key 
interest rate to a target of inflation and the output gap. Even if it is found that this 
rule is close enough to the reaction function of the Central Banks of the major 
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industrialized countries since the beginning of the 1990s, its normative use would 
require a more scientific approach to the reference variables. However, the 
proposal of Friedman is far from being always checked empirically since it 
depends on economic conditions. In addition, private agents are much more 
interested by the stability of prices and production by the stock of currency.  
The MC Callum Rule 
This monetary policy rule is monetarist inspiration that was developed
1 
by 
(Callum, 2000, p.13) and which is based on a control of the monetary base to 
achieve a final objective of nominal income. M.C. Callum (2000) introduced him 
in terms of growth rates of three variables expressed in logarithms, as follows:  
 
      
         (  
       ) 
Variable identification: 
      : Growth rate of the monetary base. 
      : GDP growth rate targeted by the monetary authorities. 
         : Growth rate of GDP. 
      : Average rate growth of the flow rate of the monetary base. 
Following this rule, monetary authorities determine the quantity of central money 
to inject depending on the gap between the objectives of growth of production 
compared to the observed result. However, these monetarist inspiration rules have 
been very used in practice and which are qualified as - monetary targeting policy. 
Despite his contribution to monetary policy, this rule shows the non-adaptability 
and its end following experiences in various countries that it was practiced leaving 
the field of research to other modeling approaches. 
 
2.2. The Inflationary Bias of Discretionary Policies 
Of the thirties of last century, (Henry, 1936, p. 1) began against discretionary 
policies in the conduct of monetary policy showing their shortcomings and he 
advocated the use of policy rules as alternatives to those of fine adjustment. Since 
a long debate between monetarists and Keynesians; they are for fine tuning by the 
discretionary policies interest rate. However, these discretionary Keynesian-
inspired policies have marked their power during the sixties and just at the 
beginning of the 70‟s. But, these Keynesian inspirations scored after the first oil 
shock and the mounted inflation with higher rates, adverse consequences and were 
by their end towards the end of the seventies. 
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In this context, empirical studies have emerged showing the lack of these 
discretionary policies in the stability of prices to the rules
 
like remedy lane. This 
fact, (Kydland & Prescott, 1977, pp. 21-46) have developed and formalized the 
notion of temporal inconsistency that, even in the absence of uncertainty, the 
decisions that an agent takes at the moment “t” are sometimes conflicted with 
what he had planned to take previously (at time “t-1”). This principle is based on 
an assumption of behaviors irrationality and/or expectations. As a result, the two 
authors showed that discretionary policies (Guillard, 2002, p. 32) do not maximize 
the inter-temporal utility of agents that would be rational expectations.  
According to them, the best chosen policy takes into account past and present 
decisions. But it will be difficult to apply in the case of dynamical systems. 
Indeed, even if the decisions of private agents rely on the basis of future economic 
policy decisions, discretionary policy, is likely to result, loss of well being since, 
by anticipating every moment looking for an optimal solution, discretionary 
policy will be coherent over time. 
Taking into account the notion of inconsistent time, monetary policy is facing a 
problem of the theory of games, thus within the extension of the theory of rational 
expectations. In this context, the authorities, having a dominant strategy can 
minimize their losses if agents expect the rule and avoid the worst situation if 
agents expect the discretion. Therefore, there is no dominant strategy equilibrium. 
It is a Nash equilibrium in which each player considers that its strategy is optimal 
independently from that of the other players. 
This lack of cooperative equilibrium between the authorities and agents will 
generate an inflationary bias and more unemployment. What has helped with 
Kydland & Prescott (1977) to generalize this analysis emphasizing that optimal 
solutions in the short term of discretionary policies lead to long-term losses well 
be seen the inconsistency of policies. Furthermore, to eliminate this inflationary 
bias engendered by the time inconsistency problem, authorities are led to commit 
credibly to a systematic rule. In this context, (Barro & Gordon, 1983b, pp. 101-
122) developed an innovative model that has shown that to be effective policy 
must be based on a commitment within the rules rather than discretionary actions. 
The main objective of the Central Bank to minimize cost Zt function which is 
defined for each period, as follows: 
     (  )
 ⁄    (     
 )    Where:          
With   (  )
 ⁄  measure the cost of inflation1 and   (     
 ) generated by a non-
anticipated inflation (inflation surprise). The gain    parameter is variable over 
time (suite, for example, in a supply shock). His average is equal to  .  
                                                     
1 The quadratic form of the first term indicates that costs are positively with inflation. 
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The objective of the Central Bank is, therefore, minimize the present value of the 
costs that it will suffer: 
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Where,    is the discount rate that is always positive between t and    . There as 
average . It is assumed that the Central Bank controls monetary policy and that it 
can fix, thus, the rate of inflation    without that she knows    and   . Similarly, 
the agents form their anticipation   
  without knowing    and   . 
By adopting a policy of discretion, the Central Bank chooses the inflation rate that 
minimizes his loss expectancy, taking as data expectations for inflation of the 
agents on the periods t and t+1 (future costs are considered fixed):        . The 
solution of discretionary policy is therefore:        
 
 
. Then, private agents 
anticipate rationally inflation which will be equal to:   
        
 
 
 
After inflationary shocks eventually become zero (  
         ), so, there will 
be a cost of discretionary policy, by period, equal to:   
     ( )   ⁄ . On the 
other hand, if the authorities announce in advance that they will follow a rule of 
inflation, meaning that they are committed to achieve a level of inflation which 
officers know to be honored (credible rule policy)inflation expectations will 
coincide with actual inflation.  
The Central Bank program is, therefore,       , under condition that (    
      ) 
as:    . Therefore, in all functions in cost      have in   , the relative surprise 
inflation term shall be zero. Only costs remain, and of course, the optimal policy 
is for the Central Bank to achieve inflation zero         . The cost per period 
associated with this policy will therefore be to   
     .  This cost, in relation to 
that policy of discretion is weaker, which confirms, according to Barro and 
Gordon rule policy is the best policy to follow. 
Finally, this debate which deals with the choice between rule and policy 
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discretion, well shows the superiority of the latter in the short term. However, this 
superiority reverses rule policy reasoning in the medium and long term. And this 
was said by (Taylor, 1993, p. 195): “If there is something on which 
macroeconomics is clear and on which there is consensus, it is that, to ensure the 
economic performance, policy rule has more advantages than discretionary 
policy”. 
 
2.3. The Shortcomings Experiments of Targeting Monetary Aggregates 
Another argument had described (Mishkin, 1999a, pp. 580-605) the foreign 
experiences following the strategy of targeting of monetary aggregates; witch is 
the intermediate targets of monetary policy. To do this, the announcement of a 
monetary aggregate targeting rule is based in their pursuit on the following three 
pillars. On the one hand, it is necessary to follow the evolution of a monetary 
aggregate including the conduct of monetary policy. On the other hand, once the 
Monetary Authority to set the monetary aggregate properly chosen. The last task 
is more important which shows the degree of effectiveness of monetary authorities 
as that responsible to deviations received monetary aggregate to its target.  
However, since the 1970‟s, Central Banks in industrialized countries had used this 
strategy which seems to be an effective tool to regulate the monetary aggregates, 
they are considered as the main determinants of inflation in the long term. In the 
United States, this monetary targeting regime began in 1970, but the 
announcement to the public of the objectives in terms of growth of the aggregate 
target (M1) was practiced until 1975. However, the Federal Reserve considers not 
a priority the realization of these objectives compared to the reduction of 
unemployment and optimization of the interest rate that is why the aggregate M1 
has known a significant fluctuation. The Federal Reserve was unable to reach its 
target several times, and eventually abandon this system in 1993. 
For the United Kingdom in 1973, started this strategy of targeting a broader 
monetary aggregate (M3), but its formal publication of the objectives announced 
of 1976. However, the Central Bank has encountered difficulties in implementing 
its monetary aggregate M3 target, thereby; this practice cannot survive long and 
ended up abandoning it towards the end of 1992. In the same circumstances in 
1975, the Canada started the use of this system of monetary targeting, while 
adopting a programmed limiting the growth of M1 in a target range. But by 1981, 
as homologous experiments (United States, United Kingdom), this strategy takes 
its end in Canada. 
Furthermore, this strategy of monetary targeting has lost its adequate weapons 
showing his failure in the end to the 1970s and the beginning of the eighties, in 
most industrialized countries, facing an environment characterized by the 
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importance of the deregulation of the interest rate and financial (of new financial 
products) innovation, in fact, leading to a destabilization of the aggregates 
monetary and subsequently impeding the attainment of the objectives. 
Furthermore, this strategy was enabling to realize the expectations of monetary 
authorities in fact of these perpetual movements affecting, near or far, the 
monetary policies of various industrialized countries and transition. 
 
2.4. The Difficulties with the Objective of Price Stabilization 
A prior analysis to the resolution of the problem of the integration of asset prices 
in the reaction of the Central Bank function is to identify the channels and 
mechanisms of interaction between the GDP, inflation and asset prices. Indeed, 
this knowledge is necessary to assess the potential impact of financial shock and 
to deduce the ability of monetary authorities to neutralize them (Bernanke & 
Gertler, 1999, pp. 18-51). 
In this context, (Artus, 2003, pp. 61-72) suggests
 
that a Central Bank can be 
brought to integrate asset prices in its objectives insofar as these price 
developments can reveal macroeconomic imbalances that are not detectable in the 
variations of the price of the goods. For Goodhart (1999, pp. 17-49), the only 
measure
 
of inflation by the traditional index (consumer price index) is a poor 
measure of inflation and he suggested that the monetary authorities integrate asset 
prices in the determination and the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, this new 
method of measurement of purchasing power will increasingly include the 
phenomenon of financial
1
 inflation. 
Poterba & al. (1995, pp. 295-372) have shown, in the case of the United States, 
that an increase of 10% of the price of stock assets induces an increase of the 
actual consumption of 0.3% with a quarter of delay. In addition, the impact of an 
increase of the prices of the assets is particularly sensitive when one distinguishes 
between different types of consumption. 
The question of the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices in the 
context of macroeconomic stability has been a theoretical advance with 
contributions of (Bernanke & Gertler, 1999, pp. 18-51) and Cecchetti, Gemberg, 
Lipsky and Wadhwani (2001). These authors have shown that the optimal 
monetary rule, in terms of stabilization of inflation and activity, is a rule of type 
inflation target without reference to asset prices. Taking explicit account of asset 
prices would disturb the stability of the economy.  
                                                     
1 If an agent spends its cash now by purchasing shares, for dividends, and the dividend increase, it is a 
phenomenon of financial inflation. 
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2.5. The Direct Inflation Targeting (D.I.T) Rules 
For several decades, especially the mid-1970s, the world was governed by high 
levels of inflation which has caused so severe threats; saw their fluctuation 
inconvenient and rising costs increase continues prices (Cecchetti & al., 2001, pp. 
1-39), for monetary stability. Therefore, the Central Banks of various countries 
held in search for offensive ways to cope with this high inflation and maintaining 
it at lower levels. However, some countries had already appealed to the monetary 
aggregates and the fixed exchange rates. But during the 80‟s try inflationary have 
accentuated and be accompanied with the debt crisis of developing countries 
therefore putting an end to these practices even if they have obtained a degree of 
success that remains limited. Therefore, only at the beginning of the 1990‟s, 
marking the emergence of a range of innovation in the field of monetary policy: It 
is the decision of the implementation of explicit targets to control inflation and 
promote stability of prices in industrialized countries, firstly, followed than by 
merging and developing countries (New Zealand in 1990, Canada in 1991, Brazil 
in 1999, Norway in 2001, Turkey in 2006, Ghana in 2007, others in 2010 and 
after, etc.) i.e. Consensus Economics, Consensus Forecasts, 2010. 
 
2.5.1. The contribution of Svensson (1999) to Monetary Policies Rules 
Lars E.O. Svensson (1999b, p.1-77) has developed a simple macroeconomic 
model
1 
that illustrates the operation of a scheme aimed the achievement of 
inflation targets. The output gap, as a percentage of potential GDP, y, is generated 
by the global supply short-term function: 
          (         )         (1) 
The term yt-1 is the output of the previous period, and ρ (<1) the degree of 
persistence of the gap. The inflation rate is represented by πt and the rational 
anticipation of inflation rate, subject to the information at the end of the previous 
period, Et-1 πt. The parameter  : expresses the strength of the response of 
production to an unexpected variation of inflation (or the price level). The 
economy undergoes a supply shock ε during each period. It is independent shocks 
to identical probability with mean zero and variance, ζ². 
The Central Bank targets an inflation rate π* and do not like that the actual 
inflation rate departs from π*. However, Central Bank dislikes the production 
gaps. In order to express formally these objectives of the Central Bank, we 
                                                     
1 The model presented here is that of Svensson (1999b), presented in the form simplified by Dittmar 
and Gavin Kydlind (1999a). 
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represent its Loss function L by the following equation: 
     [∑  
   (   
  (    
 ) )    ]    (2) 
During each period, the Central Bank „loss‟ is determined by the square of the 
differential output gap from zero and the square of the variance of the rate of 
inflation from the target. The coefficient λ represents the ratio between the weight 
given away from production and that the Central Bank sets to differences in the 
rate of inflation relative to its target. The Central Bank is concerned not only 
results of the current period, but also of the future behavior of output and inflation. 
It applies to future periods the actualization factor β (<1). 
The Central Bank does not formally commit to the objective which it pursues. She 
uses her discretion each period to minimize L in equation (2), subject to the 
constraints imposed by the equation (1). In this formal model, the Central Bank 
directly controls the rate of inflation. This hypothesis is adopted for the sake of 
convenience
1
. The solution to the problem of the Central Bank is provided by a 
decision rule that distributes the supply shock for the current period between the 
rate of inflation and the output gap. It is convenient to represent this solution by:  
    
  
 
    
                  (3) 
The parameter b is selected optimally by the Central Bank (cf. appendix). Given 
this decision rule, the rate of inflation and the output gap are expressed thus:  
    
  
 
    
                          (4) 
              (    )                    (5) 
The variability of inflation and output gap, measured by their non-conditional 
variance, are expressed thus: 
  
  
  
    
          (6) 
       
  
(    ) 
    
                            (7) 
The parameter b depends on all settings and varies systematically with λ. A 
Central Bank that attaches no importance to the evolution of the production (λ=0) 
installation b equal to zero, so that it stabilizes the inflation rate to π * and leave 
the output gap follow the path ρyt-1 + εt, with a variance equal to 1 / (1 - ρ²) ζ². 
                                                     
1 Svensson (1999a): “an add intermediate instruments and equations that describe their links with 
production and inflation, or we consider the inflation rate as the sum of the forecast of the Central 
Bank regarding inflation, as this last control, and of independent control and identical average 
probability for error zero”. 
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A Central Bank that attaches great importance to the evolution of the production, 
(λ= λ*), sets b=1/  in order to output gap follows path ρyt-1 with zero 
unconditional variance. 
Arbitration between the variability of output and inflation depends on b and  , ρ 
and ζ. The values of these parameters depend on the time interval represented by 
the index t. When t is a quarter, the parameters take the following reasonable 
values: ρ = 0, 9 and   = 0.5. Figure 1 show the arbitration in question, the variance 
of the supply shock that lasts only one period is normalized to unity.  
Once these values had chosen for ρ and  , we let b equal to 2/3 so that inflation 
and the output gap have identical equal variances at 2.34 times that of the supply 
of a period shock. When b=2 =1/ , the output gap is stabilized in zero and the 
inflation rate is highly variable around its value target π*. When it chooses b=0, a 
Central Bank „obsessed with inflation‟ stabilizes the rate of inflation at its target 
level and at the price of a variability of production which is about five times 
higher than the variance of the supply shock of a period. 
 
Figure 1. Arbitrage between the variability of output and inflation 
(Source: Svensson L., 1999a, p. 20) 
We have seen that the establishment of inflation targets provides a general 
framework of macroeconomic stability that does not prevent to give great 
importance to the stability of the production, which allows to use one or other of 
the many proposed monetary control techniques, which forced the Central Bank to 
aim for a well-defined objective, while leaving it free to dip in its expertise and 
the means at its disposal to achieve the objective in question, and which takes into 
account the persistent supply shocks, in endorsing them in part. 
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2.5.2. The Gradual Adjustment of Inflation Targeting 
Based on the model of (Ball, 1997, pp. 127-156), where the interest rate, which is 
fixed (sometimes even varied) by the monetary authorities in the context of 
monetary policy, is an effective tool to unexpected shocks to the economy. Thus, 
Ball L. was able to describe the economy through the following two equations: 
  {
                                                      
                                                         
                                       
    
Where {
            
      
  
Where ε and η are, respectively, the demand shock and supply shock and which 
are qualified as white noise (WN). 
   : is the equation of curve IS where the output will depend on the rate of delayed 
interest and demand shock   .    : is the Phillips curve equation, where variation 
in inflation depends necessarily on delayed inflation, will also depend on the delay 
of output and the supply shock   . 
If hypothetically the two shocks    and    are not anticipated by the public(    
     ), subsequently, the anticipation (mathematical expectation E[x]) of output 
and inflation is expressed as follows: 
{
 [    ]                                                                                “ ”
 [    ]                                                                                        “ ”
 
From the perspective where the studied model is linear and quadratic, in this case 
the political authorities may fix the anticipation of the output in function of 
anticipated inflation [    ]. As a result, we can deduct that the optimal policy is 
linear, represented by: 
  [    ]     [    ]  De même,  [    ]    [      ]      “3” 
With q: positive parameter (its optimal value is determined in annex). Thus, if we 
refer to the Phillips curve equation “2”, inflation anticipated by the monetary 
authorities, in this case, in both periods, is described as follows:  
 [    ]   [    ]    [    ]               “2‟” 
Furthermore, a simple substitution of the last equation”2‟” leads:  
 
 [    ]   [    ]    [    ]   [    ]   [    ]   (   [    ]) 
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 [    ]     [    ]            [    ]   [    ] (     )           « 2‟‟» 
However, the equation « 2‟‟» is a gradual change from the inflation target and fit 
qualified as a generalization for strict inflation targeting. If q varies from [0, 1/ ], 
is led to the entire series of efficient and optimal policies. Therefore, this efficient 
policy of targeting with gradual adjustment is described as optimal since 
responsible authorities have attempted to detect the rate of inflation adjusted to its 
target level, even there is a quadratic cost given the change in inflation.  
 
2.5.3. The Strict Inflation Targeting  
The policy of strict inflation targeting, in inflation given level, is efficient by 
minimization of the variance of inflation around its average level target. Thus, this 
policy which is already formulated by (Svensson, 1996, pp. 210-227) is to set the 
inflation deviation
 expected for two periods of its target level (i.e. E [π (t+2)]) to 
another level equal zero. Referring to the equation of generalization expressed 
above by:  
 [    ]   [    ] (     )                          1/       « 2‟‟» 
It should be well noted, given that the variables delayed in the model, this policy 
can affect only after two periods ahead. 
 
3. The Policy of Inflation Targeting: Practice and Interest 
At the end of the 1980‟s, many industrialized countries followed by emerging 
market countries have begun to target inflation. Where, the emergence of a new 
strategy in the formulation of monetary policy such as under the name of 
“inflation targeting strategy” has concerned a number of authors including 
(Mishkin & Svensson, 1997, p. 31), Mishkin (2000b, p. 8) and al. The policy of 
inflation targeting is defined as a decision rule that aims to increase transparency 
around the monetary policy conducted by a Central Bank. Moreover, far from 
apply automatically this transparency rule rests in fact on a vision, flexible and 
pragmatic monetary policy for releasing real result. (Masson & al, 1998, p. 21) 
 
3.1. The Central Bank Independence: Guarantee of Credibility 
The inflation targeting - framework of monetary policy that forced the Central 
Bank to ensure low inflation - contributed largely to the maintenance of the 
stability of prices in industrialized countries. Developing countries could also 
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benefit (Sharma, & al., 1997, p. 57), from this approach that increases 
transparency and pushes officials to deepen reforms.  
The strategy of inflation targeting: prerequisites adaptability 
The practice of this policy requires three conditions: the independence of the 
Central Bank, the absence of an implied exchange rate target and transparency in 
the conduct of monetary policy (Agenor, 2000a, pp. 47-87.), (Schaechter & al. 
2000, p. 202) an entirely successful inflation-targeting system called certain 
conditions, in this case a strong fiscal position in the sense that monetary policy 
should not be dictated by purely budgetary considerations, a well-developed 
financial system, the independence of the Central Bank and a mandate to achieve 
price stability. 
On behalf of (Jbili & Kramarenko, 2003, pp. 30-33), the preconditions for the 
success of inflation targeting are: a healthy budgetary situation and coordination 
of fiscal and monetary policies, a well-developed financial system, the 
independence of the Central Bank in the driving relatively well understood 
between the instruments of monetary policy and inflation, and credibility based on 
strong background accountability and transparency. To implement a policy of 
inflation targeting, certain conditions must be met namely:  
 The independence of the Central Bank. 
 The absence of another implicit target. (Masson et al., 1998; Mishkin, 2000) 
 Macroeconomic stability and a stable financial system. 
 The performance of monetary policy instruments. 
The strategy of inflation targeting: prerequisites adaptability 
A new strategy in the formulation of monetary policy known as inflation targeting 
has concerned a number of authors including (Mishkin & Svensson, 2000, p. 32). 
It is characterized by the implementation of monetary policy with the main 
objective, an inflation rate, or a low and stable price level several arguments 
(Mishkin & Posen, 1997, pp. 42-56) in favor of the adoption of the inflation 
targeting policy. 
Improving communication and transparency of monetary policy 
Inflation targeting promotes a greater transparency of the strategy of monetary 
policy through communication with the public and the markets of information 
regarding plans, objectives and decisions of the monetary authorities. This context 
will increase the responsibility of the Central Bank to achieve its objective of 
inflation (Mishkin, 2000, p. 61).  
Transparency also plays a key role in telling the market that Central Banks are 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol 11, no 2, 2015 
 
 88 
responsible for the results obtained, which favors in return a greater discipline in 
the design and implementation of their policies. Transparency also plays a role in 
monetary targeting insofar as the strategic objectives, including the intermediate 
targets, are published. But inflation targeting proponents argue that their approach 
maximizes transparency and communication. On the one hand, it is true that the 
explicit announcement of inflation targets is easier to understand for ordinary 
people than the notion of any particular monetary aggregate growth. 
Elimination of temporal inconsistency accountability of monetary authorities 
According to Mishkin & Posen (1997), this monetary policy strategy helps to 
focus the political debate on what is the Central Bank can do (control inflation) 
instead of that is what it cannot do (increase economic growth in a permanent way 
by pursuing an expansionary policy). Moreover, the policy of inflation targeting 
that is based on a consistent rule strengthening commitment to the stabilization of 
the loss function has to solve the problem of time inconsistency. 
 
Effective measure of credibility of monetary policy 
This monetary policy framework provides a measure of credibility of monetary 
policy that simplifies the evaluation of the monetary policy resulting in a high 
responsibility. Inflation targeting can be used as a mechanism for potential 
commitment reducing or eliminating inflationary bias and increasing the 
likelihood of achieving and maintaining low and stable inflation. It has the key 
advantage that it is easily understandable by the public and therefore, it is highly 
transparent. Thus, the rule of explicit inflation targeting may stand as an optimal 
contract (Svensson, 1997, p.8).  
 
3.2. Inflation Targeting Policy: the Practical Setting 
The adoption of a target of control of inflation in several developed countries has 
led Central Banks to take some numbers of measures to achieve this objective and 
to increase their credibility. As a result, in the early 1990‟s, the strategies designed 
by the Central Banks of Western countries, which have adopted explicit targets, 
acquired an independence from the political authorities and mechanisms of 
transparency towards their public, have controlled and achieved a high degree of 
credibility. 
 
3.2.1.  An inflation or price level rate: target she should he choose? 
At present, all countries being equipped with targets, have defined them inflation 
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rather than the price level. Nevertheless, the question of which of these two types 
of target is most favorable to the economy, remains open. In fact, this intensely 
debated issue is discussed (Mishkin, 2004, p. 28) following seminar: “reflections 
on targeting inflation”. 
The choice target for the price level. According to some models (i.e. Svensson, 
1999; Woodford, 1999; Dittmar; Gavin & Kydland, 1999; Dittmar & Gavin, 2000; 
Vestin, 2000), the use of a target established on the basis of prices level rather 
than inflation, gives rise to a lower variability of production. Such target can 
reduce uncertainty about the level to which will be the price to distant horizons.  
Although the models mentioned above, in particular those where prices are 
established in a prospective framework, do not indicate that the adoption of a 
target based on the price level increases the variability of production, they ignore a 
particular problem (Mishkin, 2000, p. 54) that it has concerned, either the fact that 
the use of such target can give rise to periods of deflation more frequent which 
could result in instability in the financial markets. Which can cause (Fischer & 
Schnadt, 1994, pp. 262-308.), in the short term, much greater volatility in terms of 
monetary policy, if prices are rigid, in the actual sphere of the economy.  
The choice target for the inflation rate 
Taking into account the disadvantages highlighted by (Mishkin, 1999, p. 29) in 
particular the dangers associated with periods of most frequent deflation, a target 
expressed in relation to inflation look for Mishkin, far preferable to a target based 
on the level of prices. If no Central Bank has decided to take the level of prices for 
target in recent years, it is perhaps due in part to the fact that the leaders of the 
Central Banks share his concerns about the dangers of deflation. 
Determining the target range of inflation control 
The target for inflation is used at least two important purposes for countries 
adopting this scheme of this kind as the case in New Zealand and the Canada. It 
serves as a first guide to the public. Thus, should establish a range wide enough to 
be credible, i.e. a range target as can reasonably be expected that most of the time 
inflation is within the target zone. We supposed to believe that the range of 0 to 
2% is selected initially targeted in New Zealand (1-3% Canada; generally other 
industrialized countries maintained their range targets around 0-3%), were not 
regarded as entirely credible in public opinion because of its narrowness, but it 
eventually reveals his contribution to effectiveness. 
The choice of the target horizon for inflation 
The horizon of the inflation target is the time it takes for monetary policy 
measures to neutralize the effects of a shock on the economy to return inflation to 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol 11, no 2, 2015 
 
 90 
the target rate. It is held, obviously, to determine the horizon of policy, i.e. the 
speed of reduction of inflation. Given that unforeseeable shocks that can at 
various times driving inflationary effects, the Central Bank cannot operate to close 
a certain time limit. Therefore, it must attach a horizon that it considers sufficient 
to achieve the targeted inflation level. This horizon of the achievement of the 
inflation target must at least correspond to the delays of transmission of the 
monetary policy, the deadlines for the actions of a change in the rate of interest on 
the price level. 
 
A point target rate or target zone 
In this context, it must choose between a one-time target rate and a target area (i.e. 
a target within a predetermined tolerance zone). Given the difficulties inherent in 
the prediction of inflation as well as the uncertainty as to the delays of 
transmission of the monetary policy, the risk of missing a target rate (and suffer 
the consequences in terms of credibility) is greater. In addition, a target rate may 
require a more precise adjustment of monetary policy to minimize the risk of 
failure. 
The formulation of forecasting methods for inflation 
Unlike other monetary policy regimes, that of inflation targeting assigns a 
fundamental importance to the forecast, including that of the inflation evolution 
which is the main intermediate target of monetary policy. Indeed, as the monetary 
authorities detect a deviation from the expected target inflation level, they employ 
the necessary actions to eliminate this deviation.  
The choice of the index (CPI) as a measure of inflation 
The authorities must first determine what will be the parameter used to measure 
inflation. The two obvious choices are the price for consumption (CPI) and the 
GDP deflator index (which takes into account capital goods prices or unit labor 
costs). If the latter has the advantage of more accurately reflect the concept of 
“domestic” inflation. 
CPI offers net benefits to the operational plan: this is the index that the public best 
knows. It is usually calculated monthly and circulated promptly (and can therefore 
be followed regularly), and should rarely be subject to revisions. In addition, if the 
monetary authorities manage to stabilize the rate of increase in the consumer price 
index, they should also succeed in stabilizing the other clues around the same 
long-term trend. 
3.2.2. The Publication of Data of Monetary Policy 
In most countries that have adopted the inflation targeting regime, the Central 
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 91 
Bank regularly publishes data on the situation of inflation, including the current 
forecasts and key actions necessary to maintain the level of this inflation within 
the target range. As is pointed out above, is the establishment of these reports on 
the conduct situation of monetary policy and the degree of achievement of its 
objectives that makes this more attractive regime in terms of improving 
communication and transparency. 
3.2.3. Some Failure to Enumerate 
The pursuit of target on inflation by Central Bank, without that the prerequisites of 
the implementation of the above mentioned inflation targeting strategy are 
properly met, can thus lead to negative consequences, presented as follows: in this 
case, the monetary authorities can not control easily inflation given the uncertain 
effects of monetary on the latter.  
Thus, it is much more difficult for the Central Bank to achieve a target of 
aggregate monetary (Mishkin & Posen 1997, p. 25). Thus, the monetary 
authorities must, first, determine the setting used for the measurement of inflation 
to the definition of the price series. These series must be accurate, temporal, and 
readily understandable by the public. Then, they must choose between a one-time 
target rate and a target zone. The risk of missing a target rate is greater in light of 
the difficulties inherent in forecasting inflation
 
(Croce & Khan, 2000, pp. 48-51). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The dilemma rule vs. discretion, in the heart of the monetary policy action, 
remained still arises with the various contributions of authors in this matter being 
taken into account an essential point which is the current situations and the 
economic circumstances which differs from one country to another. An essential 
point that the works are slightly outnumbered leaving the future researches open 
to economic models integrating other components as explanatory variables of the 
phenomenon lived for the quasi-homogenous countries which are comparable to 
the economic level, to draw therefore significant results.  
However, despite these contributions in matters of monetary policy, an overview 
on emerging economies and those industrialized, shows with clairvoyance that 
inflation is difficult to predict exactly despite these entire rules target, both short 
term and long term. This lack of precision poses two major problems for the 
inflation target strategy. The first is strictly operational. Given the large delays 
between monetary policy actions and the response of inflation, a weak forecast 
suggests that a specific inflation target is extremely difficult. The second problem 
is referring to the credibility of the Central Bank. If inflation is largely 
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unpredictable and ultimately not controllable (Cecchetti, 1998, p. 11), therefore, it 
will be difficult to judge if the Central Bank put its best effort to achieve the 
inflation target. 
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